Modern society relies heavily on the robust functioning of systems that are intricately networked with one another, either in an explicit or an implicit manner. While increasing the 1
interconnectedness between infrastructure systems can result in a higher efficiency of service, it also makes the constituent systems vulnerable as a whole to cascading failures. Such cascades of failures have been studied generally in model networks [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] and specifically in the context of engineered systems such as the power-grid [6] , the internet [7] and transportation and infrastructure systems [8] , in the context of the financial institutions [9, 10, 11, 12, 13] , and within ecological systems [14] . However, in addition to the risk of cascading failure being present within a particular domain (e.g., the network of financial institutions), there are also risks arising because of the coupling between systems in diverse domains [15, 16] . Indeed, the primary thesis behind many societal collapse events in the history of mankind is that of a cascade of diverse risks being materialized [17] . Examples of such cross-domain failure cascades include the collapse of the society on Easter Island stemming from deforestation that led to agricultural and economic instabilities and civil unrest, and the demise of the populations of the Pictairn and Hendersen Islands caused by an environmental catastrophe on their common but geographically distant trading partner of Man-gareva. The acceleration of technological advances over the last two centuries and the virtual dissolution of geographical borders as a result have only increased the coupling between risks in diverse domains and across geographically distant systems. The recent economic crisis and its widespread effects across the globe have demonstrated this all too clearly. The need to quantify the dynamics of large scale risk materialization lurking within this globally interconnected tapestry is therefore an urgent one. Moreover, enriching our understanding of systems formed by diverse, interconnected sub-systems spanning environmental, social and infrastructural domains, constitutes a logical progression in our endeavors of studying the physical world.
As a qualitative means to this end, the World Economic Forum (WEF) publishes each year, a dataset defining the network of global risks [18] . The dataset published in 2013 is the result of crowdsourcing information from over 1000 experts belonging to industry, government and academia who identify global risks, the likelihoods of their materialization, the effect of their materialization on other risks, and the potential impact of each risk materialization. These risks can be broadly classified into five categories: economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological. This crowdsourced global risk network dataset thus provides an expert perspective on the severity of different risks and the possible associations between their respective materializations, both of which are often intangible to a non-expert.
The value of crowdsourced data has been well documented through the rise of online encyclopedias and question-answer sites, and use of tagging or classification by groups of experts for recommendation-based services such as Pandora and Netflix. Motivated by these concrete examples of the value of crowdsourcing, we apply here our approach to the WEF dataset on global risks as a starting point in performing a quantitative study that can generate actionable insights. Specifically we propose a model for the materialization of risks on the network, which allows us to estimate the parameters associated with the network, and thereby elucidate which risks are particularly harmful, if materialized, given the interconnected nature of risks. These quantitative insights can in turn form a sound basis for specific recommendations from domain experts that for example, could be suggestions on how to decouple the severely harmful risks from the network, or to reduce their materialization probabilities.
Our approach provides a general prescriptive framework for exploiting the value of crowdsourced assessments in a quantitative manner. In such situations, as demonstrated in what follows, several mappings of the expert assessments to network parameters are subjectively justifiable; however employing a maximum-likelihood approach allows one to objectively eliminate inferior models, providing either one or a small set of models which provide equivalently robust results.
We utilize two datasets for this study. The first is the global risks dataset made accessible by the WEF in 2013, wherein each expert provides the likelihood that each of 50 risks will materialize internally in the next decade. These scores are provided on a 5 point scale with the lowest score being 1 and the highest being 5. We denote the average likelihood score obtained by risk i as L i . Second, the dataset also provides from each expert a list of pairs or risks such that both risks in each pair are perceived as having influence on each other. We assign to each pair a score of 1. For a given pair of risks (i, j), we sum up the expert scores associated with the listed pairs (i, j), (j, i) and denote this summed quantity as w ij , which captures some overall association between risks i and j. By definition w ij = w ji . We write the probabilities of risk materialization in terms of the L i s and w ij s obtained from the WEF dataset and the parameters of our model.
The second dataset is one that we collected using an extensive survey of literature and news reports that captures the instances of risk materialization over the years 2000 − 2012 at timeresolution of a month. We utilize this dataset to calibrate the models that we propose, and subsequently to pick the one that provides the best fit.
Model
We assume a discrete-time model of risk materialization and propagation on the network of global risks. Specifically, we assume that at each time step t, each risk i is associated with a state variable S i (t) ∈ 0, 1 corresponding to whether the risk is active (materialized) or inactive (not materialized) at that time. The state of the entire set of risks at time t can therefore be represented by a vector S(t). The dynamics progresses by assuming that each time step t: (i) a risk i that was inactive at time t − 1 materializes due to internal factors with probability p int i .
(ii) a risk i that was active at time t − 1 causes a risk j to materialize with probability p out ji (iii) a risk i that was active at time t − 1 recovers from the materialization due to internal factors with probability p rec i
We assume that these three probabilities are independent of each other and states of the system or probabilities at the time instances other than the current (so the system evolution is a Markov Chain). These three processes are also Poisson processes, governed by their intensities,
Change of the time unit will result in change in the intensities by the multiplicative factor being the ratio of the old time unit and the new time unit. We will require the same property from our mapping of expert assessment into probabilities, discussed below.
Given the probabilities of internal materialization, external influence and internal recovery, the probability of a transition in a risk's state between consecutive time steps can be written in terms of these probabilities:
where A(t) represents the risks that are active at time t, and P i (t) x→y is the probability that risk i transitions between time t − 1 and t from state x to state y, or in other words S i (t − 1) = x and S i (t) = y.
The next step is to relate the fundamental probabilities employed in the model to quantities provided by the expert survey, namely, the likelihoods of internal materializations of risks over a decade, and the influence that a given risk's materialization has on that of another. We begin by assuming that the likelihood of a risk internally materializing within a decade measures also the overall vulnerability of the entity underlying the risk. Thus equivalent to the risk network,
we can also think of the network whose nodes represent the physical entities underlying the risk. Henceforth, whenever we refer to the failure of a node, it refers to the associated risk having materialized or, in other words, having become active. A reasonable assumption is that the fundamental probabilities present in the model depend on the vulnerability of the nodes in question. To make these dependencies more explicit, we introduce some notation. Let us denote the probability that risk i materializes for internal reasons in a decade as p dec i and its complement 
This normalized likelihood score N i is in direct relationship to the node's vulnerability to failure. We will express the various probabilities in the model in terms of the normalized likelihood score of the node involved. Next, we assume that the relationship between some probability that a risk does not materialize in a decadep dec i and the normalized likelihood scores assumes the following exponential form:
It is worth emphasizing here that there is no reliable standard procedure to convert Likert scores (like L i ) into probabilities because ordinal scores do not specify any particular form for intervals on a probability scale. However, by assuming a form as in Eq. 3, the mapping from Likert scores to probabilities is free to assume convex (for α > 1) or concave (for α < 1) forms, with the free parameter α c deciding upon the best form that can match a given set of data.
Also important is how the assessments map onto the underlying Poisson process intensity.
We havep
By changing the time unit from a decade to t u , we get
Hence, we conclude that the mapping that we used is independent of the time unit selected and changing time units merely results in multiplicative change of the exponent alpha of mapping by ratio of new to the old time unit.
Clearly, the same applies to the corresponding probability of failure in a given time step for any temporal resolution smaller than a decade, can then be represented as:
where α is a parameter responsible for mapping the normalized likelihood score into the corresponding probability and t u is an interval of time measured in years for which the relevant probabilities are being computed. For this study, we use a month as the fundamental unit of time which implies that t u = 1/120. Thus, the probability of risk i materializing due to internal reasons is written as:
Next, we assume that the overall vulnerability of the entity underlying the risk also defines, together with the parameter γ, the probability per unit time step of the risk recovering from the materialized state due to internal factors, p rec i , hence,
We assume that the probability p out ji of a materialized risk j influencing the materialization of risk i depends on the vulnerability of the latter via a parameter β but only if the undirected influence edge joints nodes i, j (w(j, i) = 1, hence
Note that for risks i and j that are not influencing each other in the experts' opinion i.e.,
The forms provided in Eqs. 7, 8, 9 define the model completely, and all that remains is to fit the parameters α, β and γ optimally to the time-series data capturing the risk materialization events over the last 13 years.
The fundamental unit of time in our time-series data is a month i.e. each risk is assigned a state per month in the years between and including 2000−2012 based on our survey of literature (see Methods). Given the states of each risk in each of the 156 months, the likelihood of observing this particular sequence of risk materialization events through the dynamics generated by our model can be written as:
and consequently, the log of the likelihood of observing the sequence is:
Thus, for a given set of values of parameters α, β and γ, one can compute the log-likelihood of the observing the given time-series of risk materialization using Eqs. 1 and 11. By scanning different combinations of α, β and γ over their respective acceptable ranges, and by computing the resulting log-likelihoods, we estimate the values of α, β and γ that maximize the likelihood of observing the data (see Methods for details). As shown in Fig. 1 , the likelihood function is itself is smooth with a unique maximum that guarantees that our estimated parameter values are indeed globally optimal for the model considered. These optimal values are α * = 5/9, β * = 1/9, γ * = 8, and the log-likelihood of observing the data given these parameters is −504.559.
Contagion potential of risks
Using the optimal parameters for slightly different model, we investigated the relative importance of different risks. First, in analogy with epidemic studies, we calculate the contagion potential of individual risks i.e., mean number of failures that a node induces given that it has failed alone. For a risk i, the exact expression for this quantity is: (12) where N refers to the total number of risks. This expression assumes that risks other than i can only be activated through the influence of risk i and not internally. Figure 2 shows a visualization of the network capturing the contagion potentials as well as the internal failure probabilities obtained using the optimal parameters (the mapping of node indices to the risks is provided in SI Table 2 ). As is clear from the figure, the internal failure probability is not necessarily correlated positively with the contagion potential of the node.
Hence, a frequently materializing risk does not necessarily inflict the most harm through its connections; for example, although risk 42 ("Cyber attacks") has a relatively high probability of internal materialization, its contagion potential is low. In contrast, node 25 ("Global governance failure") has both a high probability of internal materialization, as well as a high contagion potential. However, most striking is the fact that node 8 ("Severe income disparity") has both the highest internal materialization probability and the highest contagion potential. This is particular notable in light of the recent claim that income disparity in the United States is highest ever in 86 years [20] . The five nodes with the highest contagion potentials are: 8 -"Severe income disparity", 1 -"Chronic fiscal imbalances", 25 -"Global governance failure", 12 -"Failure of climate change adaptation" and 17 -"Rising greenhouse gas emissions".
Network activity and risk-persistence
Next, we performed Monte-Carlo simulations of both the network model and the independent model. As shown in Fig. 3 (a) , simulations of the network model with optimal values of all three parameters, produces a mean activity level that is commensurate with the historical data, and the total activities per month observed in the historical data lie well within 1.82 standard deviations of the mean activity as obtained from simulations of the full model. In comparison, the most extreme activity observed in the historical data lies about 2.67 standard deviations away from the mean in the case of the independent model ( Fig. 3(b) ). This difference further corroborates the fact that network effects are indeed important in reproducing the observed data. Figure 3 (c) shows explicitly the comparison between mean activities produced by the two models. . The most persistent risk was risk 8 ("Severe income disparity"), active about 88% of the time, followed by risk 1 ("Chronic fiscal imbalances"), active about 67% of the time, risk 17 ("Rising greenhouse gas emissions") active about 60% of the time, and risk 40 ("Water supply crises") active about 52% of the time. Another interesting aspect is the distribution of the number of active nodes obtained in the simulation. Under our model, the chances that all risks cease to be active is exceedingly small, about 0.00016%. The 10 th percentile value of the number of active risks is 11 while the 90 th percentile value of the number of active risks is 21, implying that 80% of the time, the number of active risks will lie between these two values.
We also computed heuristically the maximal and minimal sets of active risks that are expected to yield a larger active set in the next time step (see Methods for details). Briefly, for computing the maximal set, we follow a greedy iterative procedure of adding nodes to an initially empty set such that at each stage of the procedure, the expected number of activations produced collectively by the set is maximized. The result of this procedure yields a maximal set size of 18 which on average produces 18.98 activations. The latter constitutes an approximate upper bound for the activity of the network. We also heuristically compute the largest subset of this maximal set, which if active, activates more members of the maximal set (on average).
This procedure yields an approximate lower bound on the number of members of the maximal set that we can observe, in expectation, in an active state of the network. The value obtained for this lower bound is 5.23 nodes, and these nodes belong to a set of size 14, corresponding to the first 14 members of the maximal set. They match the top 14 risks seen most frequently in simulations (with permutation in rank) with the exception of risk 36 that is replaced by risk 16. These 14 between them contribute on average 7 members to the total activity at any time, as indicated by the schematic in Fig. 4 (b) .
Cascading failures
We further studied the effect of risk interconnectedness by investigating the survival probability of a failure cascade initiated by a particular risk's materialization. Specifically, we performed there is greater than a 1 in a 100 chance (actual value is ≈ 0.03) that the cascade will last longer than 1200 months, i.e., a 100 years. This demonstrates the profound disadvantage of interconnectivity under the obtained parameters for the pairwise risk influence probabilities and individual risk continuation probabilities. Furthermore, we also demonstrate that certain nodes are predominantly responsible for the continuation of a cascade. Figure 6 shows the expected fraction of the lifetime of a cascade that a particular risk is active, in ranked order.
Strikingly, risk 8 -"Severe income disparity" -was active for about 80% of the lifetime of a cascade on average, while in comparison, the second most persistently active risk -"Chronic fiscal imbalances" -was active for about 33% of the lifetime of a cascade on average. The list of 14 most persistently active risks seen in cascade simulations is only a slight permutation of nodes most persistently present in the long-term simulation of the entire system reported earlier.
Finally, we computed the probability (see SI for details) that the materialization of a particular risk would result in the materialization of the four most persistent risks as seen in the cascades -risk 8, 1, 17 and 25. The average probability over initiators was 47%, with just two initiators, (47, 49) yielding probabilities below 1% and two other initiators (20, 26) with probabilities below 2%.This explains the long survival time of cascades (Fig. 5 ) since a high persistence risk can be indirectly materialized with high probability, and once such a high persistence risk becomes active, it ensures that the cascade lives on for a long time.
Summary of findings
To summarize, we have presented in this study a method to obtain a quantitative picture of the network of global risks, starting from the qualitative observations provided by 1000 WEF experts. We assume a three parameter model for the propagation of risk materialization or node failures, and obtain maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters using historical data on risk materialization.
Our model was built upon the expert assessments available in the WEF report which enabled the construction of a detailed and heterogeneous weighted network of risks. As we showed, ignoring network effects (i.e. the independent model) or ignoring specific heterogeneities in the failure likelihoods and influence (i.e. the uniform model) yielded poor results in comparison to the optimal model. This underscores the importance of the expert assessments in building a model capable of competently explaining the available activity data and therefore yielding reliable insights.
Our analysis also enabled us to identify risks which were particularly detrimental on the basis of their contagion potentials, and their persistence in the dynamics of risk activation. From these studies, the most detrimental risk appears to be "Severe income disparity". Other risks that appear to play a dominant role through their persistent materialization are "Chronic fiscal imbalances", "Rising greenhouse gas emissions", "Global governance failure" and "Failure of climate change adaptation".
Additionally, our analysis demonstrated that the carrying capacity of the network i.e. the typical activity expected in the network given the current parameters, is about 13.15 risks or about 26% of the network, of which 7 are persistently chosen from a set of 14 nodes (see Fig. 4 ). Aiming to reduce this overall carrying capacity could potentially be an overarching goal of global risk minimization.
Finally, using our model, we could quantify the persistence of risks in cascades triggered by a single initiator, and also the likelihood of the four most detrimental risks materializing during a cascade (Fig. 6 ).
There are several prospects for improving the model that we have worked with. First, obtaining more robust historical estimates of risk materialization will help us improve the fitting of the model. Second, it will be beneficial to account for slow evolution of network parameters in time. This change in network characterization will be captured by a model through yearly scores of WEF experts, resulting in time dependent L i s and w ij s. Yet another degree of detail could be added to the model by assuming different dynamics for chronic risks versus sporadic risks.
From a larger perspective, our attempt here has been to utilize data crowdsourced from experts towards gaining a quantitative picture of the network of global risks, which in turn has yielded some actionable insights. The network by definition has risks of varying complexity, which arguably makes risk mitigation process more involved for some risks than for others. In such a scenario, our quantification of the relative impacts of different risks could provide an invaluable guide to any cost-benefit analysis involved in the design of policies aimed at global risk minimization.
The ideal next step given the insights provided by our model would be for domain experts to provide tailor-made recommendations for the pertinent risks, such that the likelihood of systemic failures is strongly curbed. Thus, the contribution of this paper in our opinion, -the process of generating actionable insights using such modeling endeavors -constitutes the crucial step that lies between crowdsourced data gathering and domain specific recommendation.
Methods Summary
Expert assessments of risk materialization likelihoods and association between risks was ob- . The contagion potential of each risk was calculated using the estimated parameters for the optimal model. The minimal and maximal sets of active risks that yield a growing active set in expectation, were obtained using a greedy iterative procedure described in detail in Methods. Survival probabilities of cascades were obtained by performing Monte-Carlo simulations of the optimal model with internal contagion probabilities turned off for all risks except the cascade initiator. The materialization probability of a specific risk during a cascade,
given an initiator, was obtained using similar simulations which were terminated either when the specific risk became active, or when all risks became inactive. The fraction of simulations in which the specific risk became active yielded its materialization probability. 
Methods

Obtaining the empirical sequence of risk materialization events
Data on risk materialization events over the 13 year period from 2000-2012 were obtained through online resources, news articles and Wikipedia entries. This provided us a binary string of length 13 for each risk, where each bit of the string indicated whether a risk had materialized in the corresponding year or not. This yearly string for each risk was converted into a monthly string in the following way. We choose a temporal cluster of activity -i.e. a set of consecutive years through which the risk was active -and assign the first month of activity for this cluster as follows. First, by analyzing activity data, we attempt to associate the risk activation with a fraction of the year, like half a year, a quarter, or in case of lack of any time indication, entire year. Then we select middle month of the year fraction as the beginning of the activity.
Similarly, we designate the last month of activity for the cluster. Hence, the potential error of the starting or ending date assessment varies from ±1 to ±6 months. We assume that for all years that are between the first and last year in this activity cluster, the risk is active during all months. We repeat this procedure for each cluster of activity in the original 13 element string for each risk.
Maximum-likelihood estimation of parameters
Each of the three dimensions of the parameter space is divided into ten equal intervals and endpoints of intervals define three dimensional grid at intersection of which the function is computed. The grid point with the largest values is selected as the center of the next search space and the eight rectangular cuboids of which it is a vertex define the next search space.
If any of the eight rectangular cuboids lies outside of the original range of a parameter, the corresponding dimension is doubled and the search is continued over this enlarged rectangular cuboid. The search stops when sufficient precision of parameters is attained. As seen from Fig. 1 , the likelihood surface is smooth, and we computationally verified that the minima occur only at the boundaries of the parameter ranges under consideration and there are no local maxima in the neighborhood of all grid points, thus ensuring that within these parameter ranges, the computed maximum-likelihood is indeed a global optimum.
Greedy heuristic to estimate the carrying capacity
We used the following greedy heuristic to obtain an estimate of the carrying capacity of the network:
1. Let A m (t) denote the list of m active risks at time t and step m of the algorithm and E(S, t + 1) denote the expected number of risks active in step t + 1 if at time t set S of risks were active. E(S, t + 1) can easily be computed using Eq. 1. Initially, A 0 (t) = ∅ and step m = 0.
2. We increase step m by 1.
3. We select such risk r not already in A m−1 (t) for which n = E(A m−1 (t) ∪ {r}, t + 1) is the largest. If n > m, then we set A m (t) = A m−1 (t) ∪ {r}, t + 1) and we go to step 2, otherwise we return A m−1 (t) as the result and terminate the algorithm.
The obtained list, denoted A max , contains the largest subset of risks that is expected to activate more risks in the next step that its size. For our system, it contains s A = 18 risk. Yet, the risks activated in step t + 1 may not all be on this list, so in the following time steps after t + 1, the expected number of active nodes may start decreasing. This is why we also use the following heuristic to compute the following sub-list of A max . If F k (a m , t) > m, then we go to step 2, otherwise we return a m−1 (t) as the result and move to step 4.
For each
4. We select the smallest k for which the returned list, denoted a min is the largest.
Let s a denotes the size of a min . We will refer to risks at the first k positions of A max as recurring risks. By construction, any set of s a recurring risks will be at least as effective in materializing recurring risks in the next time step as are risks in a min set, so they will be expected to activate more than m recurring risks. Consequently, once any s a risks are activated, the expected trajectory of the system will contain at least s a recurring risks. For our system, list a min contains 5 risks and k = 15.
Materialization probability of a selected risk in a cascade given the initiator
We collected cascade materialization probabilities for selected risks (1, 8, 17, 25) given specific cascade initiators by starting simulations in which only the initiator risk is initially active. Then, we ran the simulation with internal materialization off (its probability is set to 0, so the only way risks can be activated is by influence from the already active risk). Each simulated experiment ended when either the selected risk was materialized, or all risks became inactive. The ratio of the number of experiments ended by contagion of the selected risk to the total number of experiments run (10 6 ) was used as an estimate of the needed probability.
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Sensitivity of parameters to perturbations of historical data
To ensure that our maximum-likelihood computations and estimates of parameters are not severely affected by the specific random choice of starting and ending months for temporal activity clusters of each risk, we re-estimate the parameters and the maximum-likelihoods for other choices of starting and ending months per temporal activity cluster. Specifically, we perturbed the starting and ending months of our original data by m months where m was drawn from a normal distribution with standard deviation of 2 months, and the largest m is restricted to 6 months, such that about 4% of the sum of starts and ends of activity clusters were altered. We generated 5 such randomly perturbed historical time series. We found that under these perturbations, the average maximum log-likelihood change was about 1.24%, while the average change in α, β was less than 11%, and the change in γ is less than 1%. Also, for 4 out of these 5 perturbed historical datasets, the network model continued to outperform the independent model at a statistical significance level of 0.05.
We also measured how the optimal parameters α * , β * and γ * varied as a result of the truncation of data. Removal of data corresponding to the first 36 months i.e. a 23% reduction in data, reduced β * by less than 5% percent and γ by 2.35% percent. The change in α * was higher, specifically, it is below 5% for a 12 month truncation, 12% for a 24 month truncation, and around 18% for a 36 month truncation. This shows that the growing activity seen in the historical data is largely accounted for by the model through the internal failure probability p int .
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